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WEBS OF THINGS IN THE MIND: A. NEW 
SCIENCE OF EVIDENCE 
EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST. By 
David Schum. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. 




Contemporary scholarship in the law of evidence is awash with 
theorizing about evidence, inference, logic, probability, and proof, but 
it is not clear that either the friends or the critics of this new scholar-
ship understand exactly what it is or where it is headed. The publica-
tion of Evidence and Inference for the Intelligence Analyst 1 provides a 
good occasion for a general review of David Schum's2 contributions to 
the new scholarship. His studies do much to clarify the nature of ma-
jor theoretical currents in legal scholarship in evidence. They also 
have broad implications for future research on proof processes in adju-
dication and in other legal contexts. 
Interest in matters theoretical, philosophical, and logical is not 
new to evidence scholarship in America. The leading evidence schol-
ars of the first half of this century had an overtly pragmatic bent, but 
they also had a strong theoretical and philosophical streak. These 
great synthesizers of the law of evidence - John Henry Wigmore, 
Edmund Morgan, John Maguire, and the like - devoted much atten-
tion to the logic of factual inference. These practical men were doing 
nothing less than examining the foundations of empirical knowledge. 
• Professor of Law and Director, International Seminar on Evidence in Litigation, Jacob 
Bums Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. A.B. 
1966, Yale University; J.D. 1969, LL.M. 1972, Harvard University. - Ed. 
David Schum and I are friends and we are collaborators in an ongoing research project. 
These facts surely are part of the explanation for the friendly tone of this essay. However, I also 
believe that my admiration for Schum's scholarship is merited. Indeed, I expressed my admira-
tion for his work long before he became my collaborator or my friend. See, e.g., 1 & lA WIG-
MORE ON EVIDENCE xiii, § 37.1 n.8 (P. Tillers rev. ed. 1983) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON 
EVIDENCE (Tillers)]. I should also note that Schum may not like or believe things I have said in 
this essay. 
My thanks go to Judge Jack Weinstein and Professors R. Lea Brilmayer, David Carlson, 
Richard Lempert, Roger Park, and William Twining for their comments. However, they bear no 
responsibility for any flaws in the essay. 
1. Hereinafter cited as EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE. 
2. Professor of Information Technology and Systems Engineering, George Mason 
University. 
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These evidence scholars were philosophers of knowledge, but they 
were also men of action who had little interest in epistemological theo-
ries for their own sake. They wanted to put their theories to work and 
they expected that their theorizing about inference would advance re-
form of the law of evidence. They succeeded. These men, who domi-
nated evidence scholarship, were also the architects of the modem law 
of evidence; they saw to it that their theory of inference became a set 
of working principles guiding the law of evidence. Following the ex-
ample of James Bradley Thayer,3 Wigmore, Morgan, Maguire, and 
many others argued that the principle of relevancy is a cornerstone of 
the law of evidence and that a variety of legal rules regulating the 
admissibility of evidence incorporate, or should be construed as incor-
porating, relevancy principles or relevancy-related principles. This 
thesis quickly became legal dogma4 and, thus, a "philosophical" the-
ory of inference became part of the fabric of the law of evidence. 
The theoretical foundations of traditional evidence scholarship are 
remarkably homogenous. Although Wigmore and his colleagues had 
sharp dis~greements about the nature of relevancy and inference, these 
differences of opinion, with only one notable exception, 5 concerned de-
tail rather than substance. Under the rubric of "relevancy," the lead-
ers in traditional evidence scholarship and almost all of their followers 
subscribed to a theory of inference impregnated with an epistemologi~ 
cal perspective characteristic of nineteenth-century British empiricism. 
This theory of relevancy and inference, which I have described in de-
tail elsewhere, 6 put great emphasis on the role of experience and on 
generalizations based on experience. The theory of relevancy was 
seen as the foundation and the central organizing principle of the mod-
em and "rational" law of evidence. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s a new way of thinking about 
evidence and inference began to emerge in American law schools. 
This new style of theorizing, later labelled "the new evidence scholar-
ship, "7 did not readily mesh with more traditional theorizing about 
evidence and inference. Many of the early participants in this new 
wave of scholarship were Bayesians. They talked about the coherent 
integration of subjective probability estimates, conditional probability, 
3. Thayer, Presumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3 HARV. L. REV. 141, 144-45 (1889); see 
also J. T~AYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 265·66 (1898). 
4. See 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (Tillers), supra note *, at §§ 9 & 10. 
5. The exception was the theory of proof that Jerome Michael and Mortimer Adler devel-
oped. See Michael & Adler, The Trial of An Issue of Fact: I & IL 34 CoLUM. L. REV. 1224, 
1462 (1934); see also J. MICHAEL & M. ADLER, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAi, PROOF (1931) (un-
published manuscript available in Harvard Law School library). Their theory is summarized in 
IA WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (Tillers), supra note*, at§ 37.3. 
6. IA WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (Tillers), supra note*, at§§ 37.1-37.5. 
7. Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof. 66 B.U. L. REV. 
439 (1986), reprinted in PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES 
AND LIMITS OF BAYESIANISM 61 (P. Tillers & E. Green eds. 1988) [hereinafter BAYESIANISM]. 
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prior probability, posterior probability, and various other matters, but 
they had little to say about the role of generalizations in inference. As 
the new evidence scholarship flowered, the theoretical homogeneity 
that characterized its early days waned. In addition to talk about 
Bayesianism, one now finds discussions of Baconianism, schema the-
ory, fuzzy set and fuzzy probability theory, Shafer-Dempster belief 
functions, "holism," story models and theori~ of mµrative, ~cenarios, 
statistical inference, and a gr~at deal else besides. 
Although the new scholarship is now quite diverse, it does share 
some characteristic features. For example, it focuses more on logic 
and less on law; it focuses more on proof and less on rules of admissi-
bility; and it emphasizes rigor i;aiher than rhetoric. Moreover, much 
of this scholarship grapples with fundamental problems of epistemol-
ogy, apparently in the belief that they need to be reexamined. Also, a 
substantial part of the literature in this field employs "technical" anal-
ysis, especially mathematics and formal logic. . 
Nevertheless, the new scholarship is more heteiogenous than ho-
mogenous. I have suggested elsewhere that this theoretical diversity is 
mainly a blessing. 8 It is, however, also a curse, for this diversity makes 
it very hard to answer two fundamental questions about the new 
scholarship: (1) What is it?, and (2) Where should it go? 
David Schum's Evidence and Inference provides at least a partial 
answer to the first question; this book is ari excellent primer on theo-
ries that figure prominently in the 'new scholarship. Moreover, Schum 
has made many important contributions of his own to the study of 
inference which have much to say about the directions that the new 
evidence scholarship should take in years to come. 
Of course, neither Schum's analysis of the present state of research 
on inference nor his views about the appropriate agenda for future 
research guarantee that the centrifugal tendencies of the new evidence 
scholarship will not pull it apart. The primer Schum provides is a 
critical one; it is not an apologia for every feature of the new evidence 
scholarship. Hence, it is not likely that every new evidence scholar 
will agree with his evaluation of existing theories, or with his vision of 
the appropriate mission of the new evidence scholarship. Schum's 
view of the purpose of theorizing about inference is distinctive, even 
idiosyncratic. Nonetheless, his description of the nature and limits of 
various types of theoretical inquiry is a powerfu) one, and his work 
will likely define the agenda of an important part of the new evidence 
scholarship. 
8. Tillers, Introduction, 66 B.U. L. REv. 381, 389-90 (1986) (from Symposium on Probability 
and Inference in the Law of Evidence). 
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II. BASIC LESSONS 
A. "Technical" Theory in Ordinary Language 
Schum's two-volume work, Evidence and Inference, restates and 
refines the results of more than seventy earlier works.9 The explicitly 
mathematical and formal analyses are consigned to the second vol-
ume. The first volume, and large parts of the second volume as well, 
can be read and understood by people without any special acumen in 
logic, mathematics, or probability. 
In the first of two basic tutorials, Schum offers an explanation of 
various formal theories of evidence, inference, probability, and proof. 
An impressive variety of theories is examined, including some with 
odd-sounding names such as the theory of belief-functions and subjec-
tive Bayesianism. Schum's survey also includes discussion of a variety 
of theoretical perspectives that have been unjustly neglected by avant-
garde evidence scholars. For example, Schum has useful and interest-
ing things to say about the implications of signal detection theory and 
psychophysics. 
Evidence and Inference is the only satisfactory introduction for 
nonspecialists to a number of very important recent developments in 
theories of probability, uncertainty, and inference. For example, it is 
the first and only book to make the literature on Dempster-Shafer be-
lief functions accessible to a general audience; 10 it also provides a mar-
velously intelligible and succinct explanation of L.J. Cohen's Baconian 
theory. 11 Schum's explanations of these complex theories are some-
times more lucid than those of the theorists themselves. 
B. The Role of Symbols in Formal Analysis 
It has been suggested that the new evidence scholarship may be the 
product of misguided enthusiasm for the application of scientific, 
mathematical, and logical methods to law. We know that enthusiasm 
for scientific method can be dangerous. In the early part of this cen-
tury talk about law as a form of "social engineering" was not uncom-
mon 12 and, as Professor Brilmayer has noted, 13 there was also once a 
movement for more widespread use of formal logic in law. Some of 
these earlier expectations about the benefits of social engineering and 
9. See infra appendix, at 1256-58. 
10. Vol. 1, pp. 111-16, 141-43, 212-13; vol. 2, pp. 109-23, 145-46, 227-39. 
11. Vol. 1, pp. 107-11, 138-40; vol. 2, p. 109. 
12. See, e.g., Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, 15 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY 16, 44 (1921) ("I venture to think of problems of eliminat· 
ing friction and precluding waste in human enjoyment of the goods of existence and of the legal 
order as a ·system of social engineering whereby those ends are achieved."). 
13. Brilmayer, Second-Order Evidence and Bayesian Logic, 66 B.U. L. REV. 673, 673 (1986), 
reprinted in BAYESIANISM, supra note 7, at 147. 
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symbolic logic in law were clearly unrealistic, and it is not a bad idea 
to be on guard against repetition of such mistakes. 
A few legal scholars assert that the new evidence scholarship is in 
fact another cycle of scientism. These critics say that factual inference 
and proof are inherently intuitive, subjective, and fuzzy processes and 
that the new scholarship makes the mistake of trying to make these 
processes scientific, quantitatively exact, and objective. Mathematical 
precision and quantification of evidence and inference are said to be 
objectionable on epistemological grounds, normative and ethical 
grounds, or for social reasons. 14 
The second tutorial in Evidence and Inference, which examines the 
objectives of formal analysis in the study of proof, shows that the basic 
assumptions underlying this critique are wrong. People who are not 
professional logicians or mathematicians often accord formal analysis 
a degree of authority that it cannot possibly have. Legal scholars who 
see the new evidence scholarship as a new form of scientism effectively 
(if unwittingly) capitalize on the weaknesses of exaggerated claims for 
formal analysis. The appropriate remedy for these exaggerated claims, 
however, is not to abandon formal analysis in legal scholarship on evi-
dence. Instead, a more measured and sophisticated appreciation of the 
nature and functions of formal analysis is called for. It is particularly 
important to have a better understanding of the varied functions that 
symbols such as numbers can have in formal analysis. 
Some of the criticism of the new evidence scholarship assumes that 
numerical notation in mathematical analysis of evidence and inference 
is necessarily designed to make evidence and inference either exact or 
quantitative, or both. As I have explained elsewhere, 15 numbers do 
not have to serve these functions in mathematical arguments about 
evidence and inference, and they do not serve such functions in 
Schum's analyses. Schum sees numbers and other symbolic notation 
as a special kind of grammar or language and he does not believe that 
the use of this special language entails a commitment either to exact 
quantification of inference or to objectivity in inferential reasoning. 
In his book, Schum translates Bayesian concepts and other com-
plex "mathematical" concepts into "ordinary" language (and also into 
transparent charts and diagrams). In doing this, Schum does not in 
any sense lay aside "mathematical logic" and other types of "techni-
cal" logic; as he sees it, he is simply translating that sort of logic into a 
14. See Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian Theory in 
Evidence Law, 57 IND. L.J. 1 (1982); Graham, Jr., "There'll Always Be an England": The Instru-
mental Ideology of Evidence (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REv. 1204 (1987); Nessen, The Evi-
dence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357 
(1985); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. 
REV. 1329 (1971); Zuckerman, Law, Fact or Justice?, 66 B.U. L. REv. 487, 498-508 (1986); cf 
Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 673. 
15. Tillers, supra note 8, at 383-88. 
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different language. This effort to translate technical and mathematical 
logic into a form of discourse largely bereft of numerical notation re-
flects Schum's basic methodological assumption that Bayesian equa-
tions and other mathematical systems instantiate and exemplify, rather 
than constitute, the logic of certain forms of inference. By his ordinary 
language translation Schum tries to show that the logic drives the 
mathematics, not vice-versa. 
Nonmathematicians have a tendency to think that a number must 
"stand for" or "represent" something. The function of numbers in 
mathematical arguments, however, may not be to represent any thing 
(natural phenomenon) at all, and the numbers in Schum's arguments 
are not used to count things in the world or to measure their size or 
intensity. It follows that there is nothing "statistical" about Schum's 
theory of inference. Instead, the function of numbers and other sym-
bols in his analyses is to display a particular form of logic and its im-
plications in a transparent and coherent way. Hence, Schum does not 
believe that numerical notation is essential to the analysis of the logic 
and structure of inference; in his view, the arguments made in the 
grammar of mathematics can also be made, if less elegantly and more 
arduously, without the use of any type of numerical notation. 
This kind of theoretical enterprise has often been mischaracterized. 
Some legal observers have argued that mathematical analysts mistak-
enly strive for "objectivity" in evidence and inference. 16 Where this 
criticism is aimed at people such as Richard Lempert and David 
Schum, it is both mystifying and ironic because, while Lempert and 
Schum may have made mistakes, an excessive faith in the possibility of 
making inference transpersonally objective is surely not one of them. 
It is well known that Lempert, Schum, and others like them have been 
deeply influenced by the version of probability theory articulated by 
Bruno de Finetti17 (and also by Frank P. Ramsey18 and Leonard J. 
Savage19). De Finetti's theory was not about the objectivity of infer-
ence or about the feasibility of making inference objective by rooting it 
in objectively observable facts. De Finetti firmly believed that the 
foundations of inference are subjective. ·Indeed, de Finetti believed in a 
radical form of subjectivity. For example, he believed that observable 
regularities in the world are nothing more than a case of "stable mea-
16. See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 14, at 1378·82 (discussion of statistical evidence and infer-
ence assumes that subjective Bayesian analysis is the same thing); Tribe, supra note 14, at 1361-
65 (discussion of "dwarfing of soft variables" assumes that Bayesian analysis has statistical na-
ture); Zuckerman, supra note 14, at 487 ("Much of the discussion of the role of probabilities in 
factfinding proceeds from the assumption of objectivity."). 
17. De Fineiti, Foresight: Its Logical Lows, Its Subjective Sources, in STUDIES JN SUBJEC-
TIVE PROBABILITY 51 (H. Kyburg, Jr. & H. Smolder 2d ed. 1980) (reprint of 1937 article). 
18. F. RAMSEY, Truth and Probability, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS AND 
OTHER EssAYS 156 (R. Braithwaite ed. 1931). 
19. See, e.g., L. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1954). 
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surement."20 De Finetti and others like him accord paramount impor-
tance to logic (and, to be sure, a specific type of logic) and it might 
therefore be said that they believe in "objective" rules of thought. 
Nonetheless, theorists in the tradition of de Finetti unquestionably 
hold to a subjective theory of probability. They are best described as 
"logical subjectivists" because they tend to believe that the nature of 
the connection between "laws of thought" and "reality" - events in 
space and time - is mysterious or (in de ·Finetti's opinion) utterly 
impenetrable. 
It is not easy to explain why so many intelligent observers fail to 
appreciate the role of mathematical logic in the work of scholars such 
as David Schum; there is much accessible literature that both advo-
cates and explains subjectivist interpretations of the standard calculus 
of probability. Perhaps some observers miss the point because they 
are too enmeshed within a particular intellectual and epistemological 
tradition. The philosophical roots of Bayesianism are found in neo-
Kantianism rather than in the sort of empiricist perspective that still 
dominates evidence scholarship in the Anglo-American world. A ra-
tional empiricist of the English variety tends to believe that good logic 
offers a key to the nature of empirical reality and that objective knowl-
edge is knowledge of the way things actually stand in space and time. 
While some neo-Kantians also believe in objective knowledge, the 
meaning Imputed to "objectivity" is quite different and, from an em-
piricist's vantage point, quite subjective. If a neo-Kantian believes in 
objective knowledge at all, he believes that it consists of knowledge of 
the laws or forms of thought, not knowledge of the features of particu-
lar empirical events, which he views as "accidental." Correlatively, if 
the neo-Kantian believes in reliable empirical knowledge at all, he be-
lieves that logical thinking is the best cognitive tool we have for 
achieving reliable empirical knowledge because it is the only available 
cognitive tool. Logical ordering of credal states guarantees "mental" 
coherence and consistency, but nothing else; the rest is supplied by 
faith, intuition, opinion, hunch, or who knows what - but in any 
event, not by logic or mathematics. 
While few contemporary Bayesians are as radically subjective as de 
Finetti, they are genera,lly closer to de Finetti than to English empiri-
cism. Hence, the appropriate critique of many Bayesians is not that 
they are trying to be too objective but that they are being too subjec-
tive. The great question for these subjectivist theories is whether they 
can effectively deal with empirical problems. The source of this prob-
lem is the premise that nothing in the world can objectively verify the 
validity of the logic embedded in those subjectivist theories. Excessive 
20. B. DE FINETTI, PROBABILITY, INDUCTION, AND STATISTICS: THE ART OF GUESSING 
145 (1972). 
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subjectivity - not excessive objectivity - is also the overriding prob-
lem in Schum's theoretical perspective. 
III. NETWORKS 
A. Theoretical Complexity and the Complexity of Inference 
In 1971 Professor Laurence Tribe made a multipronged attack 
against "trial by mathematics."21 He criticized a proposal by Michael 
Finkelstein and William Fairley22 that Bayes' Theorem be used in 
criminal trials to deal with certain kinds of identity problems. In their 
article Finkelstein and Fairley made the simplifying assumption that 
factual questions such as the identity of the person who is the source 
of pertinent evidence (such as fingerprints) are decisive on the issue of 
the guilt or innocence of a given defendant. Tribe argued that this 
simplifying assumption is unrealistic and that Bayesian analysis be-
comes unduly complicated once this and similar simplifying assump-
tions are abandoned. 
Tribe rightly noted that a factual question such as the identity of 
the (human) source of incriminating evidence is not necessarily the 
same as the question of guilt. To illustrate this point, Tribe examined 
a hypothetical homicide case involving palm print evidence. Suppose 
a woman's body is found in a ditch: the woman has been stabbed, and 
a palm print similar to the defendant's palm print is found on the knife 
used in the murder. Tribe observed that the issue of the identity of the 
originator of the palm print is not the same as the question of that 
source's guilt or innocence of the crime charged. The defendant might 
have been framed; the police might have planted the defendant's palm 
print on the knife. Moreover, even if the defendant in Tribe's murder 
case was the source of the palm print on the knife, it does not follow 
that the defendant was the killer. Suppose the defendant accidentally 
discovered the woman's body on the night of the killing, picked up the 
knife out of curiosity, put the knife back where he found it, and went 
home. The police then arrive at the murder scene and find the knife 
with defendant's palm print. The person who left the palm print is the 
defendant but the defendant is not the killer. 
Tribe's argument about uncertainties of this sort was a prelude to a 
more general argument about the dangers of using Bayesian analysis 
in criminal trials. He made the uncontroversial observation that un-
certainties of the sort presented in his murder hypothetical frequently 
arise in criminal trials. More controversially, he argued that Bayesian 
analysis necessarily distorts the probative value of evidence if the 
Bayesian equations applied by the trier of fact do not expressly incor-
21. Tribe, supra note 14. 
22. Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
489 (1970). 
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porate every uncertainty which has a significant impact on the proba-
tive value of the evidence in question. Finally, he demonstrated that 
the equations used in Bayesian analysis take a rather intricate form if 
uncertainties such as the possibility of a frame-up are expressly taken 
into account and he argued that a trier without substantial mathemati-
cal expertise cannot be expected to understand such complicated equa-
tions or apply them correctly. By way of example, Tribe argued that 
the possibility of a frame-up alone "strain[s] the [Bayesian] system be-
yond its breaking point" because the Bayesian equations required to 
take this possibility into account are "messy" and too complex for a 
jury to use or understand. 23 In passing, Tribe further noted that the 
evidentiary facts may themselves be in dispute, "[fjurther complicating 
the picture . . . . "24 
Tribe's argument had various interesting and novel features but 
was not entirely new. Wigmore, for example, had pointed out long 
before that inferences can run through a series of steps; that some fac-
tual inferences are merely intermediate steps in a series of inferences; 
and that in lawsuits most of the inferences about the ultimate facts in 
issue rest on a series of inferences. 25 Stated in Wigmorean terminol-
ogy, Tribe's criticism is that Finkelstein and Fairley neglected the pos-
sibility of weak links at both the top and the bottom of inferential 
chains. They ignored possible weak links at the top of an inferential 
chain by neglecting to emphasize that some factual hypotheses (such 
as "the palm print on the knife is the defendant's") are intermediate 
rather than ultimate facta probanda - that some factual hypotheses 
have significance because and only because they are the way stations 
for further factual hypotheses which do have legal significance (e.g., 
"D stabbed V"). Conversely, by calling attention (if only briefly) to 
the possibility that the matters serving as a foundation for the ultimate 
inference (to the final factum probandum) may be in dispute, Tribe 
effectively chastised Finkelstein and Fairley for forgetting that the base 
of an inferential chain may also be insecure. In Wigmore's terminol-
ogy, Finkelstein and Fairley did not pay attention to the possibility 
that a proposition which serves as afactum probans (evidence) may 
itself be afactum probandum - that a matter that serves as evidence 
of something else may itself be an inference based on evidence. 
In making these and similar criticisms of Finkelstein's and Fair-
ley's proposal, Tribe (through no fault of his own26) was apparently 
unaware that David Schum had already begun to unravel how Baye-
23. Tribe, supra note 14, at 1364. 
24. Id. at 1364 n.116. 
25. 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE§ 2 (3d ed. 1940); see also id. at§§ 25 & 41. 
26. Schum has published much of his work in rather obscure journals and often has not 
published his work at all. See infra note 43. In any event, Schum's investigations of inference 
were still in their early stages in 1971. 
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sian analysis can be structured to deal with the sorts of problems of 
multistage inference that Tribe considered. Schum's work did not and 
does not directly challenge several of Tribe's central claims. For ex-
ample, Schum's intricate analyses clearly show that Tribe was right 
about the complexity of Bayesian equations that do take into account 
the many kinds of uncertainty that appear in real-world problems of 
evidence. (Some of Schum's equations run for many pages.) By the 
same token, the extreme intricacy of some of Schum's analyses of even 
relatively "simple" problems of inference makes it hard to quarrel 
with Tribe's view that jurors cannot be expected to understand or 
properly apply most Bayesian configurations of evidence problems. 
Nonetheless, Schum did undermine one of the foundations of Tribe's 
argument. As early as 1971 Schum was beginning to demonstrate that 
the enormous complexity of problems of evidence in the real world 
may not outstrip the capacity of Bayesian methods for structuring in-
ferential reasoning. Schum's work was making it unsafe to say that 
complex, real-world problems of inference are inherently insusceptible 
of formal deconstruction and reconstruction along Bayesian lines. 
Tribe had accused Bayesians of oversimplifying problems of evi-
dence and inference in real-world litigation contexts. This charge, 
however, does not stick to Schum. Schum has consistently recognized 
- indeed, he has repeatedly and vigorously emphasized - the multi-
stage character of practically all real-world inference. Indeed, Schum 
has seen a wrinkle in inference that some legal scholars have preferred 
to ignore. He has emphasized not only the vertically cascaded nature 
of inference, but also the "lateral" connections and interactions among 
chains of inference. (This analysis, by the by, goes beyond the conven-
tional Bayesian recognition of conditionally dependent evidence be-
cause Schum's analysis recognizes the additional complications 
generated by the phenomenon of "source uncertainty.") 
B. Warp and Weft in Inference 
Schum was not the first scholar to see that the multiplicity of steps 
in inference produces complexity. A good many years before Schum 
began his work, Edmund Morgan also gave the legal world the follow-
ing picture of multistage inference.27 
A) 
+) B) 
M) +) C) 
N) +) D) 
0) +) E) 
FIGURE 1 
P) +) F 
Q) 
27. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 185-86 (1961). 
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According to Morgan, Figure 1 represents the series of inferences in-
volved in a murder case where the evidence is a love letter written by 
the defendant to the homicide victim's wife and the question is 
whether the person who wrote the love letter killed the husband of the 
female addressee. With the exception of A, which represents the love 
letter, the letters in the chart represent various factual inferences as 
well as certain supporting generalizations. For example, B represents 
the defendant's love of the victim's wife; C, the defendant's desire for 
exclusive possession of the victim's wife; and.M, the generalization "A 
man who loves a woman probably desires her for himself alone." Sim-
ilarly, D represents the defendant's desire to get rid of the victim and 
0, the generalization, "A man who loves a marrieq woman and desires 
her for himself alone desires to get rid of her·husband." 
David Schum has used similar graphic devices to represent multi-
stage inference. Schum's charts sometimes look like this: 
H 
FIGURE 2 
Figure 2 depicts a series of inferences built upon each Qther; like Mor-
gan's chart, it depicts a single series of inferences based upon a single 
piece of evidence. Schum, however, makes a qualitative extension of 
1236 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1225 




Figure 3, in contrast to Figures 1 and 2, represents two pieces of evi-
dence (indicated by the two black boxes) and it represents two series of 
inferences (indicated by the arrows on the left going vertically from 
the black box on the left to "H" at the top and by the sequence of 
arrows beginning with the black box on the right-hand side, going 
through the open box to the left, and ending (again) at "H"). More-
over, Figure 3 represents a lateral interaction between two inferential 
chains, the chain that begins with the black box on the left and the 
chain that begins at the black box on the right). 
Problems of evidence having this sort of structure often occur in 
the "real world." For example, we may interpret the black box at the 
left as "report or evidence of D's escape from jail," the open box above 
it as "D's escape from jail," the open box above it as "D's belief in his 
own guilt," and the "H" at the top as "D's guilt," and we may then 
interpret the black box on the right as "report or evidence of D's state-
ment, 'I did it.' " Schum's schema portrays, then, how separate lines 
of inference may join together to support an "upper level" inference 
(belief in guilt), which then forms a basis for the inference of "D's 
guilt." 
To be sure, Figure 3 is not yet intricate enough to portray all the 
evidence that typically interests us or all the lines of reasoning that 
typically occupy us when we face problems such as those involving 
evidence of escape. Nonetheless, the specimens of Schum's charts 
given here do suggest that Schum may have discovered a useful gram-
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mar for portraying different types of complexities and uncertainties 
that may be found in real-world problems. If a satisfactory grammar 
exists, it may of course be used to construct more detailed descriptions 
of particular problems. Schum, for example, has constructed more in-




























If this chart is not yet intricate enough, further detail may be added. 
Almost twenty years have passed since Tribe's critique of the en-
terprise of Finkelstein and Fairley. While Tribe focused on a specific 
method of formal analysis (Bayesianism), his critique presented a gen-
eral challenge to the aspirations of the new evidence scholarship: 
"Can formal analysis of evidence and inferenc'e deal with the complex-
ity of problems of evidence and inference in the real world?" Thus far, 
Tribe's challenge has not been adequately answered. However, 
Schum's proposal to treat inference as a network points the way to a 
possible answer: web-like logical structures may be rich enough to 
capture the complex and dynamic thought processes we use to puzzle 
over evidence problems in the real world. 
The notion of inference as a network has two advantages over a 
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number of other portraits of inference. First, a network accommo-
dates the phenomenon of cascaded, catenated, or multistage inference. 
Conventional Bayesian analysis (before Schum) did pay attention to 
the relationships among different inferences in its references to the re-
dundancy of evidence, but it almost entirely ignored the phenomenon 
of "source uncertainty," which occurs whenever there is a chain of 
inferences which bears on a factual hypothesis. As the example of the 
Finkelstein and Fairley article shows, this was a major limitation of 
Bayesian analysis. The network image, by contrast, practically de-
mands that attention be· paid to the equivocal character of most 
evidence. 
Second, the network concept differs from portraits of inference of 
the sort found in Morgan's diagram (Figure 1). Morgan portrays in-
ference as a chain connecting a piece of evidence and a fact. This 
chain may consist of a number of links or steps but ultimately a single 
chain is constructed. The network concept is richer: instead of being 
invited to think of inference solely as a single thread between a single 
piece of evidence and a single fact in issue, we are invited to think 
about threads that connect different pieces of evidence with different 
"terminal" facts-in-issue and about the many different ways that many 
different threads may be strung together and may interact with each 
other and transmit force to each other. 
C. Natural Inference and Theoretical Art 
Schum, unlike other Bayesians, has a surprisingly catholic attitude 
toward non-Bayesian theories. He sees merit in many theories of evi-
dence, inference, probability, and proof. Schum is also idiosyncratic in 
his admiration for Wigmore's chart method; I know of no other Baye-
sian who has taken more than a passing interest in Wigmore charting 
techniques. 
Schum's view of the mission of theorizing about evidence and in-
ference is rather different from that of some of his contemporaries. 
Some theorists think of their investigations into the logic of inference 
as investigations of a "normative" logic and they draw a sharp distinc-
tion between normative and descriptive theories of the logic of infer-
ence. Schum, however, does not believe that normative and 
descriptive theorizing are entirely dichotomous, partly because Schum 
does not distrust ordinary inference and partly because he does not 
believe in a transcendental logic of inference. He instead tends to be-
lieve that t~eory should explain the structure and logic of ordinary 
inference in natural (real-world) settings such as law and medicine. 
Schum's orientation toward the natural accounts for his theoretical 
catholicism because he believes that ordinary inference involves a vari-
ety of logics. His emphasis on ordinary logic, in a somewhat different 
way, also accounts for his interest in Wigmore diagrams. Wigmore 
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described his charting technique as a method for the analysis of "com-
plex and mixed masses of evidence." Wigmore's charts are cluttered 
with several kinds of strange-looking symbols and, on first encounter, 
his charts seem far removed from ordinary thought processes. How-
ever, Wigmore was not trying to create an artificial logic; he saw the 
chart method as a device for keeping order in common sense reasoning 
about evidence. Schum approaches formal representations of inferen-
tial reasoning in the same spirit. Thus Schum is attracted to Wig-
more-like charts because he believes that the function of formal 
theories and symbolic representations is not to restructure our logic but 
to portray the logic we use when thinking about evidence, facts, 
probabilities, and like matters. Schum believes that such charts are 
rich enough to reconstruct and mimic the sort of thinking that people 
are actually inclined to use when they face complex real-world 
problems - when they confront "mixed masses of evidence." 
Schum's theoretical respect for natural inference seemingly gener-
ates a paradox. Schum does not imagine that he is engaged in a purely 
descriptive study of inferential logic; he does not think that the func-
tion of formal, orderly accounts of the logic(s) of inference is merely to 
replicate the way that human beings already think and process infor-
mation. He believes that systematic logical analysis can improve our 
inferential reasoning. This conviction, however, seems open to the ob-
jection that no account of wh~t people actually do when they grapple 
with evidence can tell them what they should do in order to assess 
evidence in a rational way. 
Schum's approach does tend to make normative formal logic deriv-
ative of ordinary logic, but the puzzle about the normative force of 
Schum's "psycho-logic" is more apparent than· real. ·Like de Finetti 
(and Wigmore), Schum thinks of theories of inference as devices for 
self-interrogation. He believes that systematic and orderly thinking 
about our own thinking - i.e., formal reconstruction of informal logic 
- enables us to ask questions of e\'.idence which, given the way we 
think, we ()hould want to· ask. This view is not puzzling if we assume 
that (1) people are, generally, already rational crea,tures, (2) the rati-
ocinative processes of human beings can work well but they can also 
work badly, and, (3) no matter how well we already use our reasoning 
processes, careful deliberatioq. about those processes can sometimes 
m~ke them work better. 
As I have explained elsewhere, Schum's perspective on the rela-
tionship between theoretical art and natural inference mak~s a great 
deal of sense if one recalls that logic - including ordinary logic - is a 
standard rather than a brute "fact."28 Appropriately enough, Schum 
seems to approve the distinction made by L.J. Cohen between inferen-
28. Tillers, Mapping Inferential Domains, 66 B.U. L. REV. 883, 933 (1986), reprinted in 
BAYESIANISM, supra note 7, at 277, 314. 
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tial competence and inferential pelformance (vol. 1, p. 376). Formal 
analytical techniques are not designed to provide fundamentally irra-
tional people with rational methods for assessing evidence; they are 
instead tools that people can use to improve the inferential skills and 
capacities they already have. There is nothing odd about this idea. 
The common sense in Schum's position is obscured only by excessive 
devotion to the distinction between descriptive and normative theories. 
This distinction between "is" and "ought" does not work the same 
way in the field of inferential reasoning as in some other contexts. 
Schum sees merit in a variety of theoretical perspectives precisely 
because he thinks of theoretical constructs as special tools for self-in-
t~rrogation. Those tools must have different shapes and properties be-
cause our thoughts have different shapes and properties which can be 
honed only by different kinds of tools. For example, if we imagine 
that a problem involves generalizations about the world or people, no 
abstract logic can gainsay the importance of such "Baconian" think-
ing. Similarly, if we are "fixated" on the notion that our semantic 
categories have fuzzy edges, no abstract logic can deny the importance 
of the sort of vagueness that fuzzy set theory tries to address. Schum 
explains: 
Persons having an interest in various formal systems of probabilistic rea-
soning are sometimes asked: "[W]hich of these systems do you prefer?" 
This is rather like asking if you prefer your hammer to your saw. When 
you want to cut wood you prefer a saw over a hammer; when you want 
to pound a nail you prefer a hammer over a saw. Z9 
The metaphor is quaint but effective. 
I have already explained a few of the reasons why Schum admires 
Wigmore. Schum also admires the mental acuity of Sherlock Holmes. 
We can see the reason for this: Holmes was a logical fellow who knew 
how to make deductions. However, Schum also admires Charles 
Peirce who, while admiring logic, was also "pragmatic" in his attitude 
toward it. So is Schum. He believes that we should study the logics 
people actually use in various contexts. 
Schum's respect for ordinary inferential reasoning is a rough ana-
logue to the respect that ordinary language philosophy has for conven-
tional language. Schum is convinced that human beings are already 
quite logical, perhaps more than they realize. Hence, he believes that 
in the study of "rational" inference it is important to respect the way 
people ordinarily think. 
D. The Atomic Structure of Inference 
Wigmore's resort to graphic representation was motivated by his 
29. Schum, Research on the Marshalling of Evidence and the Structuring of Argument, in 
OPERATIONS REsEARCH AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE INTEGRATION OF PROBLEM 
SOLVING STRATEGIES (D. Brown ed.) (forthcoming). 
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awareness of the bewildering complexity of inference; he wanted an 
orderly way to evaluate complex arguments based on large masses and 
collections of evidence. His instincts told him that complex masses of 
evidence are more manageable if they are broken down into their ba-
sic, constituent parts. Of course, Wigmore did want to construct 
whole arguments based on such large. collections of evidence, but he 
believed that we can understand "wholes" of evidence and inference 
only if we construct them out of their "atoms." 
Although Schum, perhaps unlike Wigmore, knows that networks 
do not necessarily have to be represented by spatial forms, the reasons 
for his attachment to· symbolic networks are much the same as Wig-
more's. Schum's theoretical aims are also both "holistic" and "atom-
istic." Like Wigmore, he wants to break down global inferential 
assessments into their basic and primitive constituents; like Wigmore, 
he believes that the varieties of those constituents are finite in number; 
and,.like Wigmore, he wants to construct (or reconstruct) chains, net-
works, and webs of inference by putting those constituents together. 
Schum's project of constructing inference networks is in the spirit 
of Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica. 30 Rµssell and 
Whitehead constructed notoriously long inferential chains and net-
works by defining basic elements, propositions, and operations and 
putting them together into complex arrangements - strings of com-
plex arguments. Schum also believes that inference has an atomic 
structure - that there are basic elements, propositions, and operations 
in inference - and, like Russell and Whitehead, he also constructs 
complex inferential chains out of the basic constituents -0f inference. 
The aim of atomic analysis is to make complex mference more un-
derstandable by decomposing it into simple parts. Although the at-
oms that make up complex inference can be arrayed and related in an 
infinite variety of ways and although very complex structures can be 
built out of the basic constituents of inference, inference at the atomic 
level is relatively simple. The project of describing complex inference 
is thus conceived as the project of tediously and painstakingly assem-
bling large and complex inferential structures out of basic building 
blocks. 






Figure 5 may be restated as "a -3>- h" or "a > h ". 
30. A. WHITEHEAD & B. RUSSELL, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (2d ed. 1927). 
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We may paraphrase "a > h" as "a implies h" - provided we do 
not give the word "imply" the meaning it has in deductive logic but 
take it to mean something like "indicate" or "suggest."31 
In Schum's schema the sentence "a > h" merely states a possible 
inference. It does not assert that h should be inferred; it merely ex-
presses the possibility that h may be inferred from a. Schum gives the 
term "inference" the sense it has in formal logic; "a > h" is merely an 
"argument." We do not yet know or assert h and we do not yet know 
by what criteria to determine whether h follows from a. 
Inferential atoms can be strung together in different ways. For ex-







Figure 6 represents "a > b" and "b > h" or "a > b > h". 
Figure 5 shows a single-stage ("vertical") inference. Figure 6 
. shows a "cascaded" inference or argument: the inference "a > h" has 
more than one step. 
In constructing arguments, atoms can be arranged in an infinite 
variety of ways (although not in any way one pleases). Hence, we can 
construct more than one argument for h. If the arguments for h are 





Figure 7 reads, x > h, and y > h. 
t 
y 
Two or more independent arguments for h may themselves be 
"cascaded": 
31. I add this proviso because the diagram in the text is a graphic representation with specific 
properties and a deductive argument cannot be constructed within or by the diagram. Schum's 
diagrams are directed acyclic graphs and, as Schum construes them, arguments of the form m · > 
n in these graphs are always inductive arguments. Later in this essay, however, I argue that it is 
enlightening, for purposes of discussion only, to endow the graphs with different properties and 
use them to portray deductive arguments. See infra note 32. It is possible, I admit, that my 
reinterpretation of the logic of Schum's diagrams is logically incoherent. However, my general 
argument about the relationship between models portraying the structure of inference and mod-
els portraying the logic of inference is not affecte.d by this particular issue. 







By the same token, separate arguments for h may be related. For ex-
ample, we may have r > x > h, and· r > y > h. This ·argument 







We can also have different kinds of connections. For example, we can 











Figure 10 economically represents the following arguments 
(inferences): 
(1) r > x > h 
(2) s > y > h,· and 
(3) r > x > y > h 
E. $tructure and Logic 
Figures 5-10 say both more and less about factual inference than 
one might think: They say less than one might think because they 
assert nothing about the nature of the connectors between the basic 
particles in atoms of inference: the nature of ~· > " - and of its 
graphic equivalent, :the arrow "-?" - is left open by these dia-
grams, and the diagrams say nothing about the values that particles of 
the type "a, b, .... n " can assume (in atoms of inference of the form 
"a > b" or "a -? b"). · . 
How the meaning of ">" or "-?" is specified and what sort of 
variable "a'~ is matters because variations in the nature of the connec-
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tors and the particles in atoms of inference make the reasoning differ-
ent within each structure and may also produce different conclusions. 
Consider, for example, a property of the complex of arguments 
portrayed by Figure 10. There we can see that even if the argument s 
> y > h does not hold, we may nevertheless "get" h by reason of r > 
x > h. More generally, Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10 are argument com-
plexes with this property: if one argument for a hypothesis or conclu-
sion (such ash) drops away, it is possible to "reach" that hypothesis or 
conclusion by a different argument. For example, Figure 7 shows that 
if h cannot be "gotten" from the argument x > h, it is possible to 
"get" h from the argument y > h. 
This type of argument complex means rather different things as the 
nature of the connections between the particles of atoms of inference 
varies - as the meaning of ">" or "-7" varies - and as the char-
acteristics of the particles vary. Consider again the argument complex 







On the one hand, suppose that "-7" is taken to denote the sort 
of implication found within traditional syllogistic logic. Although 
there is a sense in which this interpretation does violence to the logic 
embedded in the sort of graph shown, 32 let's assume that I can redefine 
the logic of the graph to accommodate my deductive reading of the 
graph. Alternatively, assume that x offers conclusive suppbrt for h, 
and so does y. On either interpretation, then, if x is "true" and x > h 
is "true," h is "true" and the argument or inference y > h can do 
nothing to "enhance" or "add to" the truth of h. Conversely, if y is 
"true" and y > h is "true," the argument or inference adds nothing to 
the truth value of h. 
On the other hand, suppose that h can take degrees of value and 
suppose that those degrees are either degrees of truth or belief in truth. 
Here the arguments x > h and y > h are not necessarily redundant 
even if a truth value is imputed to both arguments and a truth value is 
32. See supra note 31. For the sake of the argument here I assume that the chart no longer 
has the property of being directed or of being acyclic. My argument, rephrased this way, poses 
the question of whether inference may be construed deductively. Schum takes the view (and I 
agree with him) that problems of factual inference cannot be construed deductively because we 
can then no longer meaningfully speak about one thing being "evidence" of another thing. How-
ever, I find it analytically useful to extend his thesis (beyond what he intends or accepts) so that I 
can leave open the question whether a deductive argument structure is a useful way of dealing 
with a problem of evidence. If this much is granted me, I can freely concede (for the sake of 
clarity) that "technically" I am no longer speaking of "inference from evidence,'' "inductive 
inference,'' or even "evidence." 
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imputed to the premises of the arguments; in this case, the two argu-
ments taken together can produce a greater truth value for h than the 
two arguments taken separately - even though the two arguments 
taken separately show (to some degree) the truth of h. 
Although the last two arguments fall within the same argument 
structure, they are arguments with quite different properties. In this 
example, the nodes in the argument networks have different proper-
ties. (The "fundamental particles" in the "atoms of inference" behave 
differently.) The result is that forces in these networks are transmitted 
differently even though the structure of these networks is the same. 
The example just adduced may suggest that it would be just as well 
to dispense with argument structures with an indeterminate or fuzzy 
logical architecture and replace them with logical systems that ascribe 
specific properties to the connectors and the variables in inference net-
works. For example, a Bayesian might argue that factual inference 
clearly involves conditional probability and uncertainty and that inter-
pretations of argument structures along the lines of traditional syllo-
gistic logic should therefore be abandoned; Ockham's razor makes talk 
about argument structures in general unnecessary and it is better to 
translate them into argument structures with Bayesian properties. 
This Bayesian might argue that the networks should be read as 
graphic expressions of assessments of the conditional probability of 
hypotheses (and he might thank Schum himself for showing how 
graphic expressions can incorporate Bayesian logic). He might also 
point to the argument in Figure 7 to support his thesis. The logic of 





In a system that assumes that h has some value between 0 and 1 -i.e., 
has a probability of more than zero and less than 100% --:- the argu-
ments x > y and y > h may stand in an additive relationship -
which is to say, the probability of h given x and y may be more than 
the probability of h given only x or only y. For example, the 
probability of rain if there are clouds in the sky and the temperature is 
low may be greater than its probability if there are just clouds in the 
sky. A Bayesian might argue that this sort of interpretation of argu-
ment structures is the only appropriate one. (The Bayesian achieves 
this interpretation of the arguments by construing expressions of the 
form x > h or x -7 h as equivalent to the notion of conditional 
probability, which is usually expressed by the notation P(X/H).) 
My hypothetical Bayesian might argue that tlie explanatory power 
of inference networks is questionable if we do indeed posit that infer-
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ences of the form a > h are arguments within traditional syllogistic 
logic. For example, in Figure 7, if we read h as a factual hypothesis it 
may seem to us that the argument or inference y > h has the capacity 
to add something even if we accept the argument x > h and affirm x. 
Syllogistic logic, however, seems to deprive y > h of any force or prac-
tical significance once h is inferred from x. 'For example, if we wish 'to 
know whether Socrates is mortal, and we know that all men are mor-
tal and affirm that Socrates is a man, the additional premise that all 
animals are mortal seems to add nothing~ A Bayesian (or another 
kind of probabilist) might argue that in reality we never encounter 
problems of factual inference with this kind of structure because in the 
real world we never encounter evidence that supports a conclusive ar-
gument for a factual hypothesis. 
Schum has done more than any human being· alive to show how 
complex inference can be interpreted along Bayesian lines. Nonethe-
less, he rejects the thesis that argument structures should always be 
reduced to a specific type of logic, even a Bayesian type of logic. Gen-
eral argument structures with open logical architecture have in-
dependent value, according to Schum, because he believes that the 
nature of the logic applicable to a problem of evidence or inference is 
often a problem with an unclear answer and that it is important not to 
prejudge the solution to such a problem by always giving argument 
forms a particular logical architecture. Hence, although Schum him-
self has evaluated inferential arguments on the basis of the premise 
that factual hypotheses - or, at least, beliefs about factual hypotheses 
- may take gradients of truth and falsity rather than just the values 
"true" and "false," and although he has also made the methodological 
assumption that those degrees of value have cardinal properties (which 
Bayesian analysis posits), he does not suppose that these suppositions 
are always mandatory. For example, he believes that an irrevocable 
decision in favor of universal use of cardinal gradients of probability 
improperly prejudges the question of the weight of an a on an h. In 
short, Schum wants to leave open the nature of the connection be-
tween evidence and hypothesis and believes that we can and must con-
sider how different theories and logics visualize the connection 
between an a and an h. 
Schum of course knows that argument structures with operi logical 
architecture cannot solve for specific hypotheses, precisely because the 
question of the logic embedded in those argument structures is left 
open and undetermined. Schum nevertheless believes that networks 
with an open logical architecture should be retained. In his view, net-
works with diffuse logical properties are useful because they invite us 
to consider the question of which logic to use. Indeed, networks with-
out specific logical properties have value precisely because they do not 
tell us how to solve for our hypotheses; their open logical structure 
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reminds us that logic-commitments for the analysis of evidence may 
remain relatively (if not wholly) open. 
The import of Schum's position is best understood in relation to 
debates about the coherence of L.J. Cohen's Baconian theory of 
probability and proof. Glanville Williams and others have argued that 
Cohen's theory of factual proof is nonsense, in part on the grounds 
that there are degrees of uncertainty and that any theory that refuses 
to acknowledge this simple fact is incoherent and intuitively implausi-
ble. 33 Schum, while agreeing that there are often degrees of uncer-
tainty, has shown that Cohen's theory is not therefore incoherent,34 
and that the question of sense and nonsense is more complicated than 
critics such as Williams think. 
The open logical architecture of Schum's networks serves as a salu-
tary reminder of a lesson that mathematicians and logicians suppos-
edly learned long ago: there are different logics and some of them are 
incommensurable with each other. That is to say: there are logical 
and mathematical systems with different properties, and these distinct 
systems of logic must not be understood as incoherent from the stand-
point of any particular system of logic, but rather simply as different. 
If we understand that principles of commutation, transitivity, and the 
like may differ in different logical systems, we can also understand that 
there is nothing incoherent about a system which, for example, asserts 
that b is uncertain in the argument a > b but that when a decision has 
been made in favor of b (rather than in favor of some other hypothesis) 
it is to be taken as true for purposes of the argument b > c. As Schum 
has shown, Cohen's reasoning is fully coherent in a logical system with 
particular properties (e.g., in a system that assigns ordinal rather than 
cardinal properties to uncertainty and that construes negation in a 
noncomplementary way). 
The value of a theory (such as one that does not speak of grades of 
uncertainty, but only ranks them) depends on the features of inference 
the theory in question is capable of clarifying. In debates about the 
logic of inference, probability, and proof the central question is oft.en 
not whether a logic is wrong, but rather, what it is for. Of course .it 
may still be true that a theory such as Cohen's is unenlightening or 
uninformative - and I confess that I myself am troubled by many of 
the uses that Cohen has made of his theory - but this question is not 
the same as the question of the logical or formal coherence of a theory. 
Moreover, the question of the proper domain of a logically coherent 
theory is generally the right one to ask. 
33. Williams, The Mathematics of Proof - I & II. 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 297, 340. 
34. Schum's most recent discussion of Cohen's theory is Schum, Jonathan Cohen and 
Thomas Bayes on the Analysis of Chains of Reasoning, in RATIONALITY IN HUMAN REASONING 
(E. Eells & T. Maruzewski eds.) (Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the . 
Humanities) (forthcoming). See also his earlier analysis in Schum, A Review of a Case Against 
Blaise Pascal and His Heirs, 77 MICH. L. REV. ·446 (1979). 
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IV. INFERENCE AND TIME 
Theorists often simplify real-world problems to make them more 
manageable; some properties of the problem under investigation are 
isolated while others are provisionally ignored. This strategy has been 
used (sometimes unwittingly) by students of evidence and inference. 
However, if the ultimate aim of theorizing about evidence and infer-
ence is to clarify the properties of proof processes in real-world set-
tings such as litigation, the "true" character of proof processes cannot 
be ignored indefinitely. Theories that ignore salient realities of proof 
processes may turn out to be either useless or positively dangerous. 
Time plays a salient role in evidence, inference, and proof but 
neither the newer nor the older evidence scholarship has said much 
about it. 35 The focus of analysis instead bas been on the effect of a 
known body of evidence on a known set of issues, which Schum calls 
"relational analysis."36 Schum does discuss the relationship between 
time and inference, however, and this paves the way for a more realis-
tic analysis of the structure and logic of inference in litigation.37 
The role of time in inference presents several problems. Schum 
shows that analysis must deal with three separate relationships involv-
ing time: inference in time, time in inference, and evidence in time. 
To begin with, time destablizes the environment for inference. In 
extreme cases changes brought by time may sweep away the lacework 
of complex inferential reasoning; inferential labor may go for naught 
because of changes in information, because of the mutation of the fac-
tual hypotheses in issue, or simply because of the decisionmaker's revi-
sions in his own beliefs. In less extreme cases the changes. in the 
inferential environment are less than global and we then wish to struc-
ture our thinking to cope with those changes and with changes yet to 
come. This is the problem of inference in time. 
However, Schum shows that time and inference are related in at 
least two other ways. First, the matters in issue may themselves be in 
time and, if they are, they are also part of some sort of causal order, 
which means that prior events may affect the probability of later 
events. Second, evidence itself occurs in time: evidence is received at 
35. The sparse legal literature on factual inference in a nonstationary environment consists 
almost entirely of literature on trial and clinical practice. Unfortunately, this literature is gener-
ally unsystematic and it generally offers little more than maxims and recipes, often of a rather 
dubious sort. · 
36. The methodology of relational analysis not only ignores the dynamic qualities of the 
decisionmaker's legal and evidentiary environment, it also assumes that the evidence at hand is 
not causally related to the temporal and causal connections among the events whose occurrence 
is hypothesized. 
37. See vol. 1, pp. 284-354; see also Schum, Probability and the Processes of Discovery, Proof 
and Choice, 66 B.U. L. REv. 825 (1986) [hereinafter Schum, Probability and Processes], reprinted 
in BAYESIANISM, supra note 7, at 213; Tillers & Schum, Charting New Territory in Judicial Proofi 
Beyond Wigmore, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 907, 907-08, 947-49, 951-63 (1988) [hereinafter Tillers & 
Schum, Charting New Territory]. 
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a particular point in a temporal order and thus, it may itself be caused 
by prior events and it may also affect or cause the occurrence of subse-
quent events. Although I cannot do justice here to Schum's discussion 
of the implications of these latter two relationships, several of his 
points about evidence in time and about time in inference deserve to be 
highlighted. 
Schum's views about evidence in time place conventional subjectiv-
ist analysis of evidence in an important light. He makes the point that 
the methodology of relational analysis and subjective Bayesianism ig-
nores the possibility of a causal relationship between the hypothesized 
events in issue and the evidence bearing on those events and that sub-
jective Bayesian views the temporal sequence of the appearance of evi-
dence and the hypothesized events as immaterial. He notes, however, 
that it certainly is not counterintuitive to assume that evidence appears 
in time and has a causal relationship with both prior and subsequent 
events. This insight generates a number of fascinating observations 
and important analyses. 
Schum's insight that the temporal order of the appearance of evi-
dence is inferentially significant allows him to tease out a number of 
important implications. He demonstrates, for example, the possible 
rationality of a decisionmaker (such as a juror) who, unlike a conven-
tional Bayesian, believes that the order in which evidence is presented 
is probatively significant. He also shows that it may be quite impor-
tant for a decisionmaker to think very carefully about the relative tem-
poral order of (1) the appearance of evidence and (2) the events that 
this decisionmaker hypothesizes may have happened. A great deal 
may ride on whether the evidence appeared before or after the event 
whose probability is being assessed. Similarly, Schum uses his basic 
premise to argue that the behavior of a processor of information may 
be inferentially and probatively significant. 
Schum's talk about time in inference also merits mention. Schum's 
recognition that it is important to think about chronology when evalu-
ating the probability of an event brings inferential theory into close 
contact with empirical studies38 of the importance of stories in deci-
sionmaking. Stories have become an important theme in much recent 
theorizing about evidence and proof. The participants in these discus-
sions, however, may not always make clear which version of the rela-
tionship between time and inference they are discussing or supposing. 
Schum's analysis shows that story analysis is generically different from 
the other two relationships between time and inference and it thus 
paves the way for clear-headed debate about the role of "stories" and 
"narratives" in proof and also for empirical research with an adequate 
analytical foundation. 
38. See, e.g .• R. HASTIE, s. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 22-23, 163-65 
(1983). 
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Schum's analysis of the workings of inference in time is equally 
subtle. The analysis in Evidence and Inference focuses on the way in 
which various argument structures might be adjusted to accommodate 
new information, new suppositions, and new questions. This analysis 
is useful because it serves as a reminder that the problem associated 
with nonstationary decision-making environments is not the problem 
of how one copes when everything changes - for if everything 
changes, nothing that was done before, thought before, believed 
before, or heard before matters. The only problem of interest is how 
we manage changes that may be significant but are not wholly uncon-
nected with the past. The charting techniques Schum recommends in 
Evidence and Inference serve in part as devices a decisionmaker can 
use in an effort to identify the extent of the changes that time has 
brought. 
Schum makes two further points in Evidence and Inference about 
the importance of thinking about inference as being in time. His first 
general message is that it is dangerous to adopt the strategy of suppos-
ing that the problem at hand remains essentially the same. Schum 
argues that we cannot cope with nonstationary problems by holding 
stationary beliefs. That strategy invites all sorts of disasters. ("The 
Russians do not have atomic weapons"; "Asbestos does not cause as-
bestosis.") Schum notes that a strategy of making guesses only about 
more manageabl~ localized sequences often is not available. (This, I 
might note, is likely to be true in litigation, where "global" factual 
assessments must often be made whether one feels up to it or not.) 
Schum further observes that even slight changes can produce dramatic 
changes in factual inferences from evidence. It follows that an ideal 
decisionmaker never sits still: 
[T]he structure of arguments we make from evidence [has] to undergo 
revision if we are to keep abreast of recognized changes in the world. 
Structural revisions . . . involve changes in our hypotheses or possible 
conclusions, changes in our assumptions, premises, and generalizations, 
and, of course, changes in the amount and kind of evidence we obtain. 
[vol. 1, p. 318] 
Schum's most general message about time in inference is probably 
the most important of all: that all inference is dynamic. Schum notes 
that we cannot stop the flow of time and freeze the moment, even for 
purposes of evidentiary evaluation. The effects of time are not occa-
sional: "[A]ll of the ingredients of [an] inference task (hypotheses, evi-
dence, and assumptions) are in various ways contingent upon time and 
the flow of events" (vol. 1, p. 292; emphasis in original). 
Schum has done other research that significantly extends the anal-
ysis presented in Evidence and Inference. In his Boston symposium 
article, 39 he presents an elaborate and stunningly original schema that 
39. Schum, Probability and Processes, supra note 37. 
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views a lawsuit as a play with various acts and scenes, and suggests 
that certain theories of inference portray some of those acts and scenes 
better than other theories do. The argument taken as a whole is pro-
vocative because of the underlying assumption that the logic of proof 
activity in time changes as that proof activity progresses, that different 
logics describe what is going on (predominantly) in different parts of 
the proof process. · 
The apparent corollary of this thesis is 'that there may be a logic 
that describes shifts in the logic of investigation, inference, probability, 
and proof in litigation and that such shifts are, roughly speaking, tied 
to the chronological development of a lawsuit. While the Boston arti-
cle may have overstated the degree to which there are relatively clean 
breaks in argument styles and structures in different phases of litiga-
tion, the paper defines some very important questions meriting careful 
investigation. 
Schum is now investigating these and other questions, with the fee-
ble assistance of this reviewer, using a simulation of a sequence of 
events that ends up, finally, in a lawsuit.40 This research may produce 
some very impprtant results and, even if it does not, it may identify the 
problems that need to be addressed to provide a model of the dynamic 
structure of proof processes. It already seems apparent, for example, 
that stories centered on individuals are a good way of storing informa-
tion for later retrieval in a changed legal and factual environment. 
This finding intersects in interesting ways with empirical and concep-. 
tual research suggesting that stories are an important device for the 
assessment of evidence.· 
V. ATOMISM AND HOLISM IN INFERENCE 
Schum sees inference as a network and he believes that networks of 
inference are extremely intricate. Hence, the web's that Schum weaves 
around problems of evidence and inference typically consist of many 
delicate threads, which crisscross in various ways. These threads are 
sometimes difficult to keep in mind and almost seem to vanish from 
sight. · · · · 
Schum's microscopic analyses of evidence and inference may seem 
unduly intricate;· it is natural to wonder whether an entirely different· 
approach to evidence and inference might work better. There has 
been discussiOn (although not quite a debate) about the value of fine-
woven analyses of evidence. I myself have sometimes wondered if peo-
ple might' do a better job of drawing inferences if, instead of analyzing 
or dissectmg evidence~ they would just look at a mass of evidence "as a 
whole," try not to think too much about it, and then irunt out a re-
~. ! ~ • 
. . . 
40. This research is supported by NSF grani SES-8704377 to George Mason University. 
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sponse from somewhere within themselves to the undifferentiated 
mass of stuff they see in front of them. 
This kind of "holistic" alternative to microscopic analysis is practi-
cally its own refutation. It is hard even to imagine what it means to 
take evidence "as a whole." We perceive slices and various features in 
almost everything we see - and if we don't, perhaps we can't see any-
thing at all. Moreover, it is hard to imagine how we can imbibe the 
evidence we "see" without performing some sort of mental analysis, 
which by definition seems to involve some sort of dissection. In short, 
it is hard to imagine how we can think holistically even if we want to 
do so. The admonition not to analyze and dissect almost seems tanta-
mount to advice not to think too carefully about the way you think. 
One might as well advise you not to think about elephants. You may 
not have been thinking about elephants before, but once you are told 
not to do so, you cannot stop thinking about them. Hence, if we are to 
believe that holistic assessments play a part in inference, we must have 
a more subtle concept of "holism." Any theory that assumes an abso-
lute dichotomy between holistic thinking and nonholistic thinking is 
thoroughly implausible and any theory that admonishes people to 
think globally rather than locally is vacuous. 
Ironically, David Schum, with his eye for microscopic detail, indi-
rectly advances an argument for a more credible version of holism. 
Schum, of course, rejects any sort of holism that denies the value of 
thinking about parts of "wholes" of evidence; he plainly thinks that it 
is important to think about details. Nonetheless, he does not believe 
that details in evidence work autonomously to generate conclusions, 
nor does he believe that theoretical analysis of evidence can provide a 
recipe or algorithm for summarizing the implications of pieces of evi-
dence which simply happen along. A decisionmaker plays a creative 
and constitutive role when he assesses evidence, and formal analysis, 
like any other kind of mental dissection, must be seen as just another 
form of this constitutive activity. 
On Schum's premises, it is impossible to construct an algorithm to 
compute the probative value of evidence because it is impossible to 
identify every detail that affects the force of evidence in a real-world 
situation. Although Schum puts evidence under a microscope and be-
lieves in the value of atomic analysis, he does not believe that it is 
possible to incorporate every significant evidentiary detail into a set of 
theoretical statements. Moreover, he does not believe that there is an 
objectively correct rendition of the structure of a problem of evidence 
and he does not even acknowledge the primacy of any particular type 
of inferential logic. Hence, although every subjectivist is a holist to a 
degree, Schum's subjectivism and holism run deeper. Not only does 
he acknowledge that different people may rationally draw different 
conclusions from evidence even when they use the same logic, but he 
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also believes that rational people may configure and construct 
problems of evidence in very different ways. 
The human actor takes center stage in Schum's theory of evidence 
and inference. Schum has profound respect for the way that ordinary 
people ordinarily think. The purpose of formal analysis of inference is 
not to straighten people out or to show them how dumb and irrational 
they are, but instead to give people devices for sorting out their own 
thinking better. He believes that this sort of methodical analysis -
which practically amounts to self-reflection - enables people to iden-
tify better the course of their reasoning, facilitates identification of the 
weaknesses and strengths in their inferential reasoning, and makes it 
easier for people to identify the nature of their disagreements about 
evidence. In all cases, however, the human actor remains the final 
arbiter of his thoughts and the final judge of the structures he should 
use to clarify and order his thinking about evidenc~. If, for example, 
the actor gains more insight by washing out details - or if the details 
confuse rather than enlighten him - he should wash out the details 
and think at a coarser, but not necessarily less reliable, level. 
Schum talks about inferential "arguments." He uses the term "ar-
gument" in the sense that logicians do, but I think he also likes the 
word "argument" for a different reason. It serves as a reminder that 
inference is a human construct and that complex formal analyses of 
evidence are also constructed, assembled, and constituted by human 
actors. Nonetheless, Schum does believe that we gain knowledge by 
constructing ~nferential arguments and he takes it for granted that 
overall arguments must be constructed out of smaller pieces. It fol-
lows that there can be no domination of wholes by atoms, or vice 
versa, and that there is no choice to be made between "holism" and 
"atomism." The rational assessment of evidence and inference in-
volves an interaction between wholes and parts. 
Schum devotes little if any attention to any general logic governing 
the interaction of parts and wholes. He evidently believes that not 
much can be said about any such logic because we have no celestial 
vantage point from which we can describe such a logic. The attention 
Schum devotes to detail suggests that he thinks that we can ascertain 
the general "feel" we have for a problem only by seeing how we are 
moved to single out parts and assemble them. All we can do is try to 
describe and explore our thinking in an orderly fashion, and when we 
find we can go no further, we know that our overall sense of a problem 
has been satisfactorily exemplified. After this, no more can be said. 
For my own part, I think the value of deconstructing and recon-
structing evidence and inference remains uncertain, and if I have any 
criticism to make of Schum it is that he seems too sure of the value of 
analysis. But uncertainty is everywhere. We live with it and take our 
chances. We could do much worse. 
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VI. MAINSTREAMS AND SIDESTREAMS 
After graduating from high school in 1950, David Schum did not 
go directly to college. In the two years following his graduation, he 
played semiprofessional basketball in the old Amateur Athletic Union, 
he played jazz piano -. well enough, it seems, to make a bit of money 
doing it - and otherwise, he tells me, he "bummed around." Then he 
went to college at Southern Methodist University. There he played 
football, briefly, but gave up this enterprise when it became apparent 
that his bones might be crushea by much bigger and stronger adversa-
ries. After graduating from college in 1956, Schum did not go directly 
into a graduate program. Instead he entered .the Air Force and .be-
came a navigator on a B-47 in the Strategic Air Command. In 1959, 
at the age of 27, he entered a: master's program in psychofogy at 
Southern Methodist University. In 1961, he entered a Ph.D .. program 
in psychology and statistics at Ohio State University.41 
I am struck by two things in this brief story of Schum's years as a 
young adult. First, whether by accident, choice, or necessity, 42 the 
path that Schum took in the decade after his graduation from high 
school was not the sort that would or should have been taken in the 
1950s by a young adult with a single-minded determination to become 
a prominent academic. Schum's path to graduate study was rather 
indirect and he got to his destination rather late. Second, his academic 
work was intertwined with an unusual mix of other activities. 
The pattern of Schum's activities as a mature scholar is not en-
tirely different. Schum is a prolific scholar and he has always had his 
admirers, but the widespread professional esteem he now enjoys came 
rather late. This was partly his own doing; his work and activity as a 
scholar do not evince a single-minded determination to gain status in 
the academic world and in many ways he seems oddly indifferent to 
professional recognition.43 Moreover, Schum's scholarly work is un-
conventionally and surprisingly varied; he has drawn on an unusual 
mix of disciplines in working out his own approach. 
Schum apparently paid a price for his theoretical eclecticism and 
41. Schum received his doctoral degree in 1964. He did postdoctoral work at Ohio State 
University, in the Laboratory of Aviation Psychology, from 1961 to 1966. In 1966 he took a 
faculty position at Rice University. He left Rice in 1985 and he now teaches at George Mason 
University. 
42. I cannot shake the feeling that Schum's own life-choices are not entirely to blame for his 
relative (but hardly complete) obscurity in years past. I see Schum as a truly original thinker and 
I cannot help but wonder whether the academic world in America had and still has invidious 
features that account for his earlier obscurity. It may be noted that few children with privileged 
socioeconomic backgrounds would have chosen' to play semiprofessional basketball in the early 
1950s. 
43. For example, Schum has quite deliberately chosen to publish much of his work in rela-
tively obscure journals and quite often he does not bother to publish his work at all. He also 
remains maddeningly silent at conferences at which people say foolish things and when he does 
criticize them he does it so gently that they do not feel at all chastised. 
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pluralism. Psychologists in the main didn't think of him as a psychol-
ogist; mathematicians didn't think of him as a mathematician; philoso-
phers didn't see him as a philosopher or epistemologist; statisticians 
didn't think of him as a statistician; and lawyers certainly didn't think 
of him as a legal scholar. They were all right, but they were also all 
wrong. He was none of these things and he was all of these things. 
Schum has concocted something new and important out of a large 
variety of disciplines. He has created, almost single-handedly, a new 
science of evidence and inference. 
Schum's work demonstrates that a theory of evidence must. be a 
science44 and that a science of evidence must provide a map of the 
mind. If the new evidence scholarship fails to adopt this perspective, 
it will become either an academic epiphenomenon or a technology that 
masquerades as a theory of evidence and inference. To be sure, if the 
new evidence scholarship takes either of these two directions, all is not 
lost; there is value in both contemplative theorizing and technological 
knowledge. However, the new scholarship began with a grander ambi-
tion: to advance our understanding of the fundamental structure of 
uncertain knowledge about the world. It should stick with this grand 
ambition. 
44. It is arguable that Schum's work is not scientific in a strict sense because his theories 
arguably are not "verifiable." I think this criticism is wrong. See Tillers & Schum, Charting New 
Territory, supra note 37, at 911 n.8. 
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